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the second half of the twentieth century by considering  performance at  the level of NUTS II and by
comparing with other Objective 1 regions of the European Union  in terms of income per capita,
unemployment and their regional dispersion. It focuses on why Crete has done better than Thessaly,
and on why Peloponnese is lagging behind. It examines the possible role of European economic
integration in recent patterns of divergence of Greece and her regions from EU averages. The paper
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performance of major European Union-supported efforts, such as Integrated Mediterranean Projects
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1. INTRODUCTION
Unequal spatial distribution of income and unequal personal distribution of income
within countries continue to be important theoretical and practical issues, despite the
significant progress of the world economy during the second half of this century.
Although income per capita has increased in many countries at historically
unprecedented rates, a number of countries and of regions within countries have failed
to keep up. A large number of studies have contributed, over the last three to four
decades, to the debate on the causes and consequences of regional inequalities.
Interest in spatial growth processes and inequalities has been renewed recently by
several influential works by Barro and Sala-i-Martin and others on the trends of
convergence or divergence across countries or regions, and by theoretical work by
Krugman and others on geography and increasing returns and by Matsuyama on
complementarities and cumulative processes in models of monopolistic competition.
1
The recent literature is concerned with balanced development and has important
implications for regional or development policies. Noteworthy in this context is the
argument advanced by Kaldor, namely that unequal regional development within a
given country poses more serious intellectual challenges for policy than unequal
development internationally [ Kaldor (1970) ]. Many empirical studies have found a
significant decrease in the level of inequality, either at the world level or within the
European Union, although reports of divergence are not entirely absent. Several
studies
2 suggest that the existence of selective tendencies, convergence clubs [ as in
Quah (1996) ],  and asymmetric shocks in various economies have led to the
persistence and exacerbation of spatial inequalities within the European Union.
A parallel literature has developed that examines in more detail the consequences of
European economic integration -- i.e. the Single European Act and the Treaty of
Maastricht -- on regional inequality. The majority of these studies predicted that the
process of European integration would worsen existing regional inequalities.  The
reasons most frequently cited are location decisions of firms, geographic features and
proximity of the various regions to major European markets, persistent differences in
the structures of European economies, and existing differences in levels of
technological and human capital development [CEC (1991), Amin et al. (1992),
Camagni (1992), CEC (1993), Petrakos (2000) ].
These views have had considerable influence with the European Commission, and
have led to the formulation of intervention policies on a pan-European scale, such as
the First and the Second Community Support Framework  (CSF I and CSF II), and the
European Community Initiatives [EC (1994) ]. A recent report  [ EC (1999a) ]
                                                       
1 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992, 1995), Krugman (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-
Martin (1994), Quah (1996), Sala-i-Martin (1997) for cross-country studies and Abraham and van
Rompuy (1995), Armstrong (1995), Molle and Boeckhout (1995) for studies between regions in the
European Union. Matsuyama (1995a; 1995b) emphasize the importance of complementarities and
propose models of monopolistic competition. Matsuyama (1996) studies the coexistence of rich and
poor countries in an integrated world economy as “symmetry breaking” that is a stable outcome.
Ioannides (1999) generalizes Matsuyama (1996) by introducing  land, and Ioannides (1998) adapts  the
model in Matsuyama (1996) to a regional setting. Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) offers an
integrated model of urban, regional and international development, where geography and product mix
interact in subtle ways.
2 Baumol (1986), Fagerberg and Verspagen (1995), Funke (1995), Chatterji and Dewhurst (1996)3
suggests that inequalities across member states of the EU declined in the 1988-96
period, but that intra-national inequalities have intensified, as the gaps between the
most developed centres and the less developed regions with respect to per capita
income growth rates and levels of income per capita have widened. Thus, it is feared
that European economic integration may have been associated with a reversal of the
process of regional convergence found by several studies in the 1970s and the 1980s.
The present study sets out to contribute to the debate on the causes and underlying
factors of regional inequality by providing evidence from Greece. Section 2 reviews
the available regional inequalities literature for Greece and presents its main findings.
Section 3 presents the main trends in key regional indicators, and Section 4 discusses
our case study, which is based on a comparative analysis of the characteristics of the
NUTS II regions of Crete, Peloponnese and Thessaly.  Section 5 reviews the
institutions for regional policy in Greece, and Section 6 presents the conclusions and
policy implications of our study.
2. SPATIAL ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN GREECE: A
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The literature on regional development in Greece offers relatively few empirical
investigations of the evolution of regional inequalities in relation to regional
geographical features and to changes in regional productive structure. The
effectiveness of spatial policies and the spatial consequences of increasing openness
of the national economy are poorly understood. This section reviews the most recent
studies and presents their main findings.
Greece’s structural weaknesses and underdevelopment relative to the EU average
qualify it as an Objective 1 Region (O1R). As a result, in discussing regional
problems in Greece we are looking at cases of  "double periphery", that is, analysing
the structure, characteristics and performance of lagging regions within an economy
that itself lags behind the EU average.
A. Greece in the EU: A Case of Convergence or Divergence?
Lyberaki (1993) and Petrakos and Pitelis (2000) have shown that Greece was
converging towards the EU until the mid 1970s. It then started diverging in the 1980s,
and remained so until the mid-1990s. The worse decade in terms of economic
performance was the 1980s. During 1981-1990 the average GDP growth rate was
1.5% in Greece, and 2.4% in the EU. In that same period, Greece was the only EU
country in which most development indicators are not simply worse than the EU
average, but also worse than any other single member. As a result, GDP per capita in
Greece as compared to EU declined. Relative GDP per capita (EU=100), measured in
ECUs, increased in the 1960s, reaching its highest value in 1970 and decreased
thereafter, with signs of stability in the mid-1990s and a trend reversal apparent in the
late 1990s. In 1995, however, Greek GDP per capita in ECU’s was equal to 45.4% of
the EU average, a figure considerably lower than that of 1981 (52.8%), 1971 (58.2%)
or even 1961 (49.1%).4
Greece's poor performance is typically attributed to several factors. First, the Greek
economy is characterised by a sectoral composition reminiscent of LDCs, that is, a
high share of agriculture, and a low and declining share of industry in GDP. Greece
stands out in this regard among all the other Southern European countries that are
members of the EU.
Second, manufacturing is not only in decline but also concentrated in such traditional
labour-intensive and light-industry sectors as food, textiles and clothing that in
general characterise earlier stages of development. Those, however, are also sectors
that seem to be shifting internationally towards LDCs, because of the significant
labour cost advantages to be found there. This has put Greece under a double
pressure. On the one hand, it is at a disadvantage in markets for modern manufactures
compared to other highly industrialised EU countries, and on the other hand it is also
at a disadvantage compared to low-wage countries in traditional markets for labour-
intensive products. This double pressure, which emanates from increasing
international competition, might have been an important factor in the decline of
industrial activity in Greece and its concentration in inward-looking sectors.
Third, Greek manufacturing is dominated by very small (by international standards)
production units [ Petrakos and Zikos (1996) ]. Over 93% of industrial firms are very
small with less than 10 employees; the average size of firms has remained equal to 5
employees per firm, by far the lowest in Europe.That is in striking contrast with the
countries of the European "core" (that is, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), which have an average firm
size that ranges from 51 to 31 employees [ Petrakos (1997a) ]. Essentially, if one
excludes public utilities, Greek industry is characterised by absence of large units and
dominance of small ones. Its smaller enterprises with traditional organisation are at a
disadvantage in exploiting economies of scale and thus suffer with respect to
international competitiveness. Overall, the weak industrial structure and low
international competitiveness of Greece is at the heart of the divergence of key Greek
indicators from the EU averages in the 1980s. Other relatively less developed
economies in the EU have had similar experiences. Although several O1Rs have
experienced similar difficulties, Greece is the only member with an overall negative
convergence record since joining the EU.
Several papers have blamed the differences in performance between Greece and the
other Mediterranean EU countries on public public policy choices. Alogoskoufis
(1993) attributes Greece’s sluggish performance to expansion of the public sector in
the 1980s, arguing that accumulated deficits crowded out private investment.
Lyberaki (1996) considers that the adoption of labour market regulation schemes such
as wage indexation, collective bargaining and labour protection laws, especially in the
1980s, was responsible for increasing unit labour cost and for reducing flexibility at
the firm level, during a time when the rest of Europe was deregulating. Finally, the
anti-multinational corporation slogans and anti-EU rhetoric of the early 1980s may
have also played a role, by discouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) in a period
where domestic capital formation was declining.
Petrakos and Christodoulakis (1997) follow a different line of thought: they
emphasise the impact of geography. They argue that Greece has had to cope, in the
post WW II period, with a uniquely unfavourable situation not found elsewhere in5
Europe. That is, Greece's location in Southeastern Europe placed it far away from
major markets and major European market centres, but a lack of common borders
made it physically isolated from other western European countries. Furthermore, as a
result of the cold war, the country 's borders were real barriers to communication and
trade with neighbouring countries.
These conditions contributed to severe distortions in the sphere of external economic
relations, with serious long-term implications for the economic structure and
performance of the country. Isolation and distance from the European core and other
Western European countries implied, in general, limited access for its domestic
products to large foreign markets. The absence of economic interaction with its
neighbours generated serious disadvantages.
Recent theoretical and empirical research has drawn attention to the importance of
geographical factors, such as adjacency and proximity, for international trade
[Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables (1995); Peschel (1990, 1992) ], and
economic development [ Gallup et al. (1998) ]. The "missing neighbours factor" in the
trade relations of Greece played a key role limiting the country’s export markets and
thus its potential for export-led growth [ Petrakos (1997b), Sachs  (1997)].
Distance from the more economically advanced countries of Western Europe may
explain why Greece's trade took on an inter-industry character during a period of
extraordinary expansion of intra-industry trade [ Petrakos (1997b) ]. Trade theory
suggests [ Gruber and Lloyd (1975), Greenway and Milner (1986, Grimwade (1989) ]
that countries trade more with their neighbours and that such trade usually takes an
intra-industry character. The lack of trade relations with the other Balkan countries
pushed Greece further towards specialising in inter-industry trade with the
technologically more advanced western European countries. However, such trade
worked rather unfavourably for the industrial development of the country. In that
respect, the post-war border conditions of the country have generated a “missing
factor” in trade relations. In addition, the small size of the country and its lack of
accessible markets with a critical size meant that industrial firms could not benefit
from economies of scale. This explains why the industrial base of the country became
the most fragmented in Europe, a condition that exacerbated the structural problems
of the economy and reduced competitiveness [ Petrakos and Christodoulakis (1997) ].
Overall, the existing literature seems to provide a number of explanations about the
diverging performance of the Greek economy during the 1980s.  Greece's
performance has been affected by the handicap of unfavourable initial conditions
related to the structure of the economy, by poor domestic policies, and (perhaps quite
importantly) by the limitations of geography and the pre-1989 division of Europe into
two political camps.
B. The Evolution and Determinants of Urban Structure in Greece
The basic characteristics of the Greek urban system are the dominance of the
metropolis and the absence of medium size cities. The metropolitan region of Athens
has doubled in size in three decades and now comprises nearly 40% of the national
population, which is close to 11 million people. Thessaloniki comes second with6
about 800 thousand inhabitants, while Patras, the third largest city of the country, has
about 250 thousand inhabitants. There are another 3-4 cities with about 150 thousand
inhabitants each, followed by several smaller cities typically serving as regional
administration centres, with population ranging from 20 to 80 thousand inhabitants.
Arguably, Greece is characterised by the most concentrated urban structure in Europe.
What factors have contributed to this highly skewed urban structure? Certainly, some
of them are related to historically given ‘initial conditions.’ The gradual expansion of
the Greek State from 1821 to 1945 through a series of independence wars has
established Athens as the undisputed administrative centre. The influx of refugees and
survivors of the 1922 war with Turkey, known among Greeks as "the Asia Minor
Catastrophe," helped solidify the preeminence of Athens in terms of population,
economic activity, culture and entrepreneurship. However, other factors have also
played significant roles.
Petrakos and Tsoukalas (1999) have examined empirically a number of factors
affecting spatial polarisation in the 1961-91 period. They found that the process of
industrialisation has been partly responsible for urban concentration. Up until the mid
1970s, agglomeration economies in industry favoured the concentration of productive
resources and population in the metropolis, while subsequently the emergence of
diseconomies of agglomeration (primarily related to transport network congestion and
pollution) favoured deconcentration. Although some industrial activity moved to the
periphery in the 1970s and the 1980s, deconcentration never really took place. The
reason is that the relative importance of industry in the economy declined in the 1980s
and the rising tertiary sector of the economy exhibited a strong preference for location
in the metropolis. Indeed, their evidence, which is not incompatible with experience in
other European countries, shows that tertiary sector producer or consumer service
activities enjoy strong urbanisation economies, generating new advantages for Athens
and re-enforcing its dominance in the urban system. They also found that increasing
urban concentration has been positively associated with GDP growth. This implies
that an expansion cycle usually starts from the metropolis, while a recession cycle hits
the metropolis harder than the periphery. Berry (1988) has made the point that the
business cycle is associated with cycles of spatial concentration of activities.
Irrespective of this explanation, this finding implies that the prospects of the Greek
economy depend on conditions in the Athens metropolis. Petrakos and Tsoukalas also
found that increases in spatial concentration have been associated with the country's
deviation from democratic politics, which is reminiscent of findings by Barro (1997)
with international data.
Petrakos et al. (2000) also examine the apparent acceleration in the development of
smaller cities in Greece during the last decade. This would have been a most welcome
development for the Greek urban system if faster growing smaller cities were evenly
distributed in space. Their analysis shows, however, that the faster growing smaller
cities are largely satellites of the metropolitan centres of Athens and Thessaloniki. As
a result, the prospects for a more balanced development of the Greek system of urban
centres are limited. Despite the increasing pressure of a rapidly internationalised
economic environment, the Athens metropolis seems to maintain or even increase its
dominance on the rest of the economy. The  newest manifestation of this trend seems
to be the tertiarization of the economy and the post-1995 economic boom. In contrast
to the international experience of industrial specialisation  of small and medium size7
cities [Henderson (1986, 1993)], Greek cities exhibit limited industrial specialization
and have similar shares of employment in manufacturing regardless of their size
[Petrakos and Economou (1999)]. This is less of a paradox when we recognise that
Greek manufacturing is mainly oriented towards local demand. Finally, while the
continued primacy of Athens is of concern, the relative stability of the Greek urban
system is not so surprising, even by the standards of developed countries as well.
Researchers, including most recently Dobkins and Ioannides (2000),  have drawn
attention to remarkable persistence in the evolution of the city size distribution in the
United States, where the urban system has undergone extensive spatial development,
as well.
C. Regional Convergence-Divergence Trends and the Evolution of Regional
Disparities
What is the evidence concerning regional trends in Greece? Petrakos and Saratsis
(2000) have examined regional inequalities at the NUTS III level, on the basis of ó-
convergence and conditional â-convergence analysis. They found that inequalities
were reduced in the 1970s and the 1980s
3. Giannias et al. (1997) also report a
reduction of regional inequalities at the NUTS II level in the 1961-91 period using ó-
convergence analysis for a number of welfare indicators. Michelis et al. (1996)
provided similar evidence on the basis of ó-convergence and â-convergence analysis
at the NUTS III level. On the contrary, Siriopoulos et al. (1997) and Siriopoulos and
Asteriou (1998) found no evidence of convergence using again â-convergence
analysis. These differences in results must be addressed.
Siriopoulos et al. (1997) estimate convergence regressions with the NUTS III (nomoi,
that is, prefectures) data for 1981-1991, but report results that are at variance with
those by Petrakos and Saratsis (2000). The differences between those two papers are
probably due to the data used as indicator of welfare. Siriopoulos et al. (1997) used
regional GDP data at the NUTS III level (provided by the National Statistical
Service), while Petrakos and Saratsis (1999) refrained from using these data, because
they are characterised by several anomalies. The most serious among them is that they
fail to provide a plausible GDP per capita figure for Athens, which is ranked,
according to those data, 12
th in the list behind many other obviously less developed
NUTS III regions. Petrakos and Saratsis (2000) chose instead to use a physical index
of welfare
4. Siriopoulos and Asteriou (1998) differs from the first in that it extends the
time period to 1996 and performs the analysis at the NUTS II level. This choice
leaves them with regressions with only 13 observations, which  is a questionable
statistical practice. That paper fails to find convergence trends in the 1981-1996
period.
A number of recent papers have examined other aspects of the Greek spatial structure
and especially that of industry. Melachroinos and Spence (1997) noticed a sharp
change taking place in the 1980s  in terms of the geography of industrial development.
The major industrial centres of the country seem to attract capital-intensive
manufacturing activities, characterised by a greater expansion of output than of
employment. Peripheral regions seem to attract labour-intensive activities that expand
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4 The index used is “household electricity consumption per capita”. Other papers, e.g., Michelis et al.
(1996), also use alternative measures of welfare, besides GDP per capita.8
employment far more than output. Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) show that the spatial
distribution of new manufacturing plant openings in Greece is affected by initial
conditions related to high labour productivity, past growth performance, population
density (which they interpret as indicating agglomeration economies), availability of
skilled labour and public spending on infrastructure.
Petrakos and Saratsis (2000) have provided the most systematic analysis of the
evolution of regional inequalities in Greece. Using regression analysis, they
investigate the behaviour of regional inequalities during the business cycle. Petrakos
and Tsoukalas (1999) test the hypothesis of positive correlation between regional
inequalities and macro-economic performance, as proposed by Berry (1988). This
hypothesis links rapid economic growth with increased regional inequalities and is
reminiscent of the growth poles theory [ Perroux (1970)  ] and of the cumulative
causation theory of Myrdal (1957). Dunford (1993) presents evidence at the European
level indicating that regional disparities tend to move countercyclically, by increasing
during recessions and decreasing during expansions.
Petrakos and Saratsis (1999)  estimate  a  regression model of the type:
ó/ x t = á0 + á1 git + åt , (1)
where ó/ x t is the coefficient of variation in the period t, and git is the rate of change
of regional GDP of the prefecture in the previous period t-1. The regression was run
with git assuming alternative lag structures for the rate of change of GDP, such as  the
arithmetic mean, MA(2), MA(3), and MA(4) in the periods t-1 and t-2, t-3, and t-4
respectively. They find a positive and significant value of the slope coefficient, which
implies that regional inequalities in Greece – just like inequality in urban areas [
Petrakos and Tsoukalas (1999) ]– move procyclically. This implies that economic
development in each cycle begins from the two major poles of concentration of
economic activity, Athens and Thessaloniki. This intensifies inequalities since its
spread to the rest of the country is by no means immediate. It also implies that in
periods of recession the metropolitan regions are hit harder than the remaining regions
of the country and inequalities are thus reduced.
These findings lend empirical support to the hypothesis that the decrease in regional
disparities in Greece in recent years is due, at least to some extent, to a prolonged
recession that hit the economy in the 1980s [ EC (1995) ]. Therefore, it is possible that
the current phase of economic recovery will be accompanied by a noticeable
expansion of regional inequality, since the evidence implies that recovery begins in
the more advanced regions of the country. This finding provides empirical support to
the hypothesis of Berry (1988), but is in variance with the evidence provided by
Dunford (1993) and the established view of the European Commission [ CEC (1991)]
concerning the relation of regional inequalities to growth at the EU level.
Indeed, European-level evidence indicates that disparities tend to diminish in periods
of strong economic expansion, while the findings for Greece tend to indicate the
opposite. Given that the advanced countries of Western Europe dominate the EU in
terms of population and GDP, a possible reconciliation of these two apparently
contradictory findings could be the following.  Economic expansion is more likely to
lead to regional convergence in advanced countries with a spatially integrated9
economic base, while it is more likely to lead to regional divergence in less advanced
countries with strong spatial imbalances and a dual economic base. This shows that
dealing with the problems of the less developed regions in Greece is a more difficult
problem than initially understood, as the spatial fragmentation of the productive base
does not allow for any significant spillover effects to take place.
Petrakos and Saratsis (2000) have also examined empirically the influence of several
structural characteristics on the growth performance of the Greek NUTS III regions
and the consequences of regional policies. They found that the prefectures with a
stronger presence of manufacturing in 1981 did grow at faster rates during the period
1981-1991. The model also provided evidence that the prefectures with a relatively
higher concentration of high quality human capital developed faster. This finding
agrees with Michelis et al. (1996). In addition, that paper shows that prefectures
hosting larger enterprises had smaller rates of the GDP per capita growth in the period
1981-1991. As such enterprises operate in larger, not just local  markets, they find
themselves competing with larger foreign enterprises. As a rule these units suffered
consequences of the increased openness of the economy after 1981, following the
accession of Greece into the EU, more intensely. Thus, the prefectures with a
relatively greater number of large manufacturing units were relatively unfavourably
affected by market internationalisation during the period 1981-1991.
They also report that the presence of tourist infrastructure is positively associated with
regional economic growth. This result is of great importance for the development of
regions which, for geographical or historical reasons, have so far failed to attract
significant industrial activity. The availability of tourism resources throughout Greece
suggests that tourism may function as a "centrifugal force" offsetting concentration in
a few areas.
3. REGIONAL INEQUALITIES IN GREECE: RECENT TRENDS
It is generally believed that in recent years there has been an improvement in the
welfare of residents of the Greek periphery. Disposable income has increased, and
patterns and levels of consumption have, in several cases, approached those of the
metropolitan regions. Internal migration has slowed, or has been restricted to just a
few regions.  This general impression emanates from the scholarly literature, which
has also found convergence tendencies, at least in the 1970s and the 1980s. At this
point, we turn to the most recent data that have become available for the 13 NUTS II
Greek regions and examine the extent in which previous trends have persisted in the
1990s.
We carry our analysis with the use of a recent data set made available by the Sixth
Periodic Report of the EC for the Situation of the EU regions [ EC (1999a) ]. This
data set provides information on Gross Regional Product (GRP) per capita (in PPP
terms) for each Greek region, as a share of the EU-15 average [ see Table 1 and
Figure 1]. Data are also available on average figures for Objective 1 Regions (O1Rs).
We note that, throughout the 1988-1996 period, only two or three Greek regions have
figures above the O1R average and the national GRP per capita. We also note that
some regions have failed to improve their relative position with respect to the EU-15
average GRP per capita.10
Table 1: Gross Regional Product (GRP) per Capita (PPP) by Region in Greece,
1988-96
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
East Macedonia, Thrace 52 53 52 53 55 57 59 60 61
Central Macedonia 58 58 57 58 61 64 65 66 67
West Macedonia 63 63 61 61 59 60 60 61 62
Thessaly 54 57 54 56 56 58 60 61 63
Ipeiros 43 42 39 40 41 43 43 43 44
Ionian Islands 55 54 52 53 55 59 60 61 62
West Greece 48 50 48 50 51 55 56 57 58
Continental Greece 72 72 68 68 64 66 65 65 65
Peloponnese 58 57 55 56 56 57 58 58 58
Attiki 61 62 61 62 66 72 73 75 77
North Aegean 44 41 41 43 45 48 49 50 52
South Aegean 68 67 65 66 68 73 74 75 75
Crete 57 64 61 62 64 68 71 72 72
Greece 58 59 57 58 60 64 65 66 68
Objective 1 Regions 63 64 64 65 65 68 69 69 69
EU15 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of Regions in
the European Union, 1999.
















Figure 2 presents a measure of ó-convergence, that is the population-weighted
coefficient of variation (ó/x ) at the NUTS II level for the period 1988-96. We note
that the overall trend is increasing. This indicates that earlier convergence patterns
may have changed, and is in line with findings by Siriopoulos and Asteriou (1998).
Those authors fitted a regression model like that of Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991),
for the 1981-1996 period, and found no evidence of convergence across Greek
regions. Although their analysis is based on observations for the 13 NUTS II of
Greece only, their findings taken together with our observation are consistent with a11
structural change occurring at some point in the early 1990s, with respect to
dispersion in growth performance across regions.  This possibility has also been
invoked by the European Commission as a trend that would threaten to offset the
gains of convergence among EU states at the national level [ EC (1999a) ].
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The evidence for Greece suggests that other forces may also be at work. During
downturns of aggregate economic activity and while the Greek economy diverges
from the EU, the prevailing trend at the regional level is convergence. During upturns
and while the Greek economy converges to the EU, the prevailing trend at the
regional level is divergence. To the extent that this finding were to receive firmer
support in the future (possibly after data sets spanning a longer period and providing
more frequent observations become available), it may show that regional disparities in
Greece do move procyclically, with booms being associated with higher regional
inequality. This is of course an old question in regional economics, but it is
particularly interesting here for two reasons. First, Greece appears to differ from other
EU countries. E.g., Dunford (1993) has shown that growth and diminishing regional
disparities in the EU have gone hand-in-hand. Second, such a relationship introduces
additional constraints and challenges for Greek policy makers.
Before we leave the subject of income inequality, it behooves us to stress that income
per capita data that is aggregated at the regional level gives a very limited picture of
personal income inequality. Unfortunately, no microeconomic data sets of sufficient
detail and frequency are available in Greece as of now. In contrast, elsewhere in the
EU, e.g. in Finland, it is possible to link microeconomic data with regionally
aggregated data and thus obtain a very detailed picture of changes in the personal
income distribution [Loikkanen et al. (1988)].
Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4 present regional unemployment data for Greece, for
1988-97. Several observations are in order. First, the unemployment rate in Greece
has been, throughout this period, lower than that of the EU-15 average, but moved
closer to it during the last few years. Second, all Greek regional figures are, in
general, well below the O1Rs-average unemployment rate, while the Greek average
rate is about 8 percentage points below the O1Rs average rate, throughout the period12
1988-1997. Third, the best performing regions have been the island regions of Crete,
the Southern Aegean and the Ionian Islands. What those regions have in common is
tourism as the main activity of the local economy. The picture for the worst
performing regions is mixed. It includes Attiki (the Athens region) which is the
largest and most developed region in the country, Continental Greece (a region
adjacent to Attiki that has suffered from industrial decline), Ipeiros (a relatively
backward, remote and economically stagnant region), and West Macedonia (a border
region that suffered heavily from industrial decline). Fourth, as a comparison between
Figures 3 and 4 suggests, regional dispersion of unemployment, as measured by the
coefficient of variation, shows a downward trend but has moved somewhat out of
synchronization with the national unemployment rate.
Table 2: Unemployment Rates by Region in Greece, 1988-97
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
East Macedonia, Thrace 9.0 6.7 5.1 4.8 6.9 6.6 7.4 9.2 9.6 8.3
Central Macedonia 6.8 6.6 5.7 5.5 6.4 7.9 8.2 9.1 8.9 9.2
West Macedonia 6.0 5.7 9.0 7.2 7.4 9.8 9.1 13.2 16.3 13.8
Thessaly 6.9 6.5 7.0 6.2 7.3 7.2 6.9 7.6 7.6 7.5
Ipeiros 5.0 4.0 2.8 8.8 7.4 7.6 8.0 7.2 11.2 10.5
Ionian Islands 3.4 2.8 3.1 3.5 2.5 3.8 3.4 5.3 5.5 6.2
West Greece 7.2 7.2 6.9 7.8 8.6 9.4 10.5 8.2 8.6 7.9
Continental Greece 6.9 5.9 5.8 6.3 10.8 9.5 10.6 9.2 10.3 12.0
Peloponnese 5.8 4.8 5.2 5.0 7.3 5.8 6.3 6.0 6.4 7.5
Attiki 10.0 8.5 7.9 8.9 9.7 11.1 11.1 11.0 11.9 11.6
North Aegean 5.4 5.9 4.2 7.9 4.8 4.3 7.0 4.9 7.1 7.1
South Aegean 5.2 4.4 4.3 3.2 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.8 4.9 4.3
Crete 3.5 2.4 2.2 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.8 4.1 3.4 4.3
Greece 7.7 6.7 6.3 6.9 7.8 8.6 8.8 9.1 9.7 9.6
EU15 9.0 8.3 7.7 8.2 9.2 10.7 11.2 10.7 10.8 10.7
Objective 1 Regions 15.6 14.5 13.5 13.3 13.9 16.3 17.6 17.5 17.7 17.2
Source: Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of Regions in
the European Union, 1999.
















In general, the good news is that Greece continues to perform better in terms of
unemployment than the average for O1Rs, in contrast to other EU countries, most
notably Spain, especially Spain's South, and  several industrially declining regions in
Spain's West. In general, the good news is that Greece continues to perform better in
terms of unemployment, in Spain's West. There are several factors that must be taken
into consideration in interpreting the significance of Greece’s better unemployment
performance. To remind the reader of  only a few, Greece has a low, by EU standards,
labour force participation ratio, a high share of population that is still employed or
underemployed in agriculture, and a dualistic industrial sector that offers opportunities
for sporadic, irregular or part-time employment. As Greece modernises, it may
experience higher unemployment rates. Regions that are especially likely to
experience higher unemployment  rates in the future are those with high agricultural
employment and high shares of employment in vulnerable industrial sectors.
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Understanding regional performance requires knowledge of the structural conditions
of the regions.  Table 3 and Figures 5-7 allow us to compare the basic structural
characteristics across Greek regions, and to relate them  to O1Rs and EU averages.
They present the shares of primary, secondary and tertiary employment for each
region in 1997. We observe that Greece, at the national level, has an agricultural
employment share which is twice that of the O1Rs and four times that of the EU-15
averages. The share of manufacturing is 5 percentage points below that of O1Rs and 7
percentage points below that of the EU. The tertiary sector of Greece is also relatively
less developed than that of the O1Rs and the EU.
Regarding regional characteristics, we note from Figure 5 that with the exception of
Attiki, Central Macedonia (including Thessaloniki) and South Aegean (including the
island of Rhodos), all other regions have shares of primary sector employment
ranging from 25% to 45%. In general, the regional variation in employment shares is
higher for the primary than the secondary and the tertiary sectors. Figure 6 shows that
the regions with the highest shares in the secondary sector are Western Macedonia (a
region with a heavy concentration of energy production), Central Macedonia
(including Thessaloniki, the second largest Greek urban agglomeration), Sterea Ellada14
(a region in the immediate proximity of Attiki) and Attiki. Figure 7 shows that the
regions with the highest shares in the tertiary sector are the two metropolitan regions
(which specialise in services) and the islands (which specialise in tourism).
Table 3: Sectoral Distribution of Employment by Region, 1997
Employment (%)
Agriculture Industry Services
East Macedonia, Thrace 40.0 17.8 42.2
Central Macedonia 19.6 25.6 54.9
West Macedonia 23.3 33.0 43.7
Thessaly 38.7 17.5 43.8
Ipeiros 30.6 20.4 50.0
Ionian Islands 26.7 16.0 57.3
West Greece 41.6 17.6 40.8
Continental Greece 31.7 27.3 41.0
Peloponnese 43.5 16.9 39.6
Attiki 1.0 25.3 73.8
North Aegean 23.6 20.0 56.4
South Aegean 10.2 20.4 69.4
Crete 37.9 12.3 49.8
Greece 19.9 22.5 57.7
EU15 5.0 29.5 65.6
Object 1 10.8 27.5 61.7
Source: Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of Regions in
the European Union, 1999
























































































































































































































































4. REGIONAL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN GREECE: EVIDENCE
FROM THE NUTS II REGIONS OF CRETE, PELOPONNESE AND
THESSALY
This section focuses on three Greek NUTS II regions with important economic,
structural and geographical differences, that have been chosen as the focus of our
analysis: Thessaly, which is a centrally located region; Peloponnese, which is the
southern most part of the Greek mainland; and Crete, which is an island (Map 1).
Crete is included in our analysis because of its superior economic performance,
Thessaly because of its undergoing structural change, and Peloponnese because of its
relative backwardness and recent stagnation.
5
                                                       
5 We avoided extreme cases of success (such as the metropolitan region of Attiki) and of failure (such
as the region of Ipiros), as the factors behind success and failure are rather obvious, in those particular
cases. Success in Attiki is mainly related to the process of tertiarization of the economy, while failure16



















We proceed with our analysis as follows. In this section we present and discuss basic
indicators of structure  and performance. In Section 5 we turn to description of the
institutional framework of regional policy and to a review of special assistance
programmes of regional development.
A. Comparative Performance Analysis
Figure 8 (which is based on Table 1B in Appendix B) plots the relative to EU-15 GDP
per head data (in PPP) for Thessaly, Peloponnese and Crete and compare them with
other Greek and O1Rs regions figures for the 1988-96 period. We note the following.
First, for the entire period, Thessaly and Peloponnese are below, while Crete is above,
the Greek GDP per capita figure. Second, during 1988-96, Thessaly has improved its
relative performance by 7 percentage points, Peloponnese has remained roughly at the
same level, and Crete has increased its performance by 15 percentage points. Greece
has improved its performance by 10 percentage points and O1Rs by 6 percentage
points. Crete has made noticeable progress, having started in 1988 below the national
average and having ended in 1996 above the national average.  Thessaly has also
made progress as it reduced its distance from the EU average (by 7 points) and the
O1Rs average (by 1 point), but not the Greek average (where the difference increased
from 4 to 7 points). In contrast, Peloponnese has made no progress. It has remained at
58 percent of the EU average, and its position has as a result deteriorated in
comparison with the Greek ( by 10 points) and the O1Rs ( by 11 points) averages.
                                                                                                                                                              
in Ipiros is related to remoteness and isolation caused by territorial morphology and poor transportation
infrastructure. We note also that Peloponnese as a NUTS II region excludes the Prefecture of Achaia,
which occupies Peloponnese’s northwestern corner and historically belongs to it.17
Third, Crete is the only one of the three Greek regions, under study here, that
performs better than the O1Rs average after 1993.













In sum, Crete has improved its position with respect to EU, O1Rs and national
averages, Thessaly has improved its position with respect to EU and O1Rs averages,
but not the national average, and Peloponnese has deteriorated with respect to Greek
and O1Rs average, but not the EU average.





































Figure 9 (based on Table 2B in Appendix B) is similar to Figure 3 and presents
unemployment data for the three regions under study, all of Greece, O1Rs and the EU.
Unemployment is not only, in and of itself, an important indicator of economic
performance.  Its behaviour during rapid economic growth often reflects changes in
frictional unemployment associated with labour-saving restructuring processes that
cause serious social and economic problems. Therefore, regions that have managed to
grow and at the same time maintain low unemployment are clearly noteworthy.18
Figure 9 shows that the regions under study have by far lower unemployment rates
than the O1Rs and lower unemployment rates than the EU. Among the three regions,
Thessaly has the highest unemployment figure, perhaps because of severe decline of
its industrial base during 1988-97. Peloponnese has lower rates, but close to those of
Thessaly’s, and Crete has consistently lower, and generally stable, unemployment
rates throughout the period.
Figures 10 and 11 (based on Table 3B in Appendix B) offer a comparative analysis of
productivity and employment growth of the three regions, Greece, and O1Rs, for the
periods 1988-93 and 1993-97, respectively. Productivity changes are in relation to EU
average, while employment changes are in percentage terms. Following Camagni
(1993), we can link the first quadrant of figures 10 and 11 with a relative "virtuous
economic cycle", as relative productivity growth is associated with employment
growth. The second quadrant may be interpreted as "assisted development," as
employment growth is associated with a relative decline in productivity. The third
quadrant may indicate a relative "vicious economic cycle", as declines in productivity
are associated with employment cuts. Finally, the fourth quadrant may be interpreted
as "economic restructuring", as employment cuts lead to relative productivity growth.
Figure 10: Productivity and Employment Change, 1988-93
˜¯(%)















We observe from Figure 10 that during 1988-93, Greece, O1Rs and Crete combined
positive relative productivity changes with positive employment changes. Thessaly
combined positive relative productivity growth with negative employment growth,
while Peloponnese is at the margin, combining positive growth with zero employment
growth. Obviously, Crete is in an enviable situation, relative to all of Greece, O1Rs
and Peloponnese, in that it combines higher relative productivity growth and higher
employment change.
During 1993-97, Figure 11, the picture changes considerably. Crete continues to do
better than O1Rs, but does not dominate Greece. The other two regions have switched
quadrants. Thessaly has moved from the "restructuring'' phase to the "assisted
development" phase, possibly thanks to the policies aimed at combating rising19
unemployment in industrially declining areas. On the other hand, Peloponnese has
moved to the "vicious cycle" quadrant, experiencing a deterioration of its position in
relative terms.
Figure 11: Productivity and employment change, 1993-97
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Overall, Crete clearly stands out  because of its performance. Thessaly follows it from
some distance, while Peloponnese is the region with the most problematic
performance. Below we attempt to account for these differences.
B. Population, Morphology and Geography
The NUTS II regions under examination are relatively small by EU standards. As
Table 4 shows, Thessaly is the largest of the three regions, with a population of 742
thousand people in 1997, followed by Peloponnese, with 670 thousand, and by Crete,
with 560 thousand people. In terms of population growth during the 1981-90 period,
Crete ranks first, and is followed by Thessaly. Both those regions have growth rates
above the national average. The population of Peloponnese has grown during this
period at a rate that is lower than the national average.
Table 4: Population: Greece vs. three Regions, 1981-97
Thessaly Peloponnese Crete Greece
inhabitants
1981 695,654 577,030 502,165 9,738,945
1991 734,846 607,428 540,054 10,259,900
1997* 742.254 670.976 560.289 10.486.595
Population change
1981-90 5.0 3.1 6.6 4.3
* Estimate
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Regional Statistics.20
Table 5: Regional Distribution of Population with Post-secondary Education, 1971-
1991
Regions 1971 % 1981 % 1991 %
Crete 7396 3.56 9858 3.06 29949 4.27
Thessaly 9252 4.45 13204 4.10 40616 5.80
Peloponnese 8952 4.31 11747 3.65 30301 4.32
Attiki 112348 45.13 185919 57.77 328801 46.98
Greece 207524 100.00 321819 100.00 699829 100.00
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Regional Statistics.
Table 6: Percentage of Regional Population with Post-secondary Education, 1971-
1991
Regions 1971 1981 1991
Crete 1.62 1.96 5.57
Thessaly 1.40 1.90 5.54
Peloponnese 1.54 2.04 5.03
Attiki 4.02 5.52 9.34
Greece 2.37 3.30 6.86
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Regional Statistics.
Tables 5 and 6 present the regional distribution of population with post-secondary
education. All three regions have shares of individuals with post-secondary education
well below that of Attiki, which accounted in 1991 for 47% of the national population
with post-secondary education. Although the three regions under examination have
similar shares, Crete and Thessaly seem to have a slightly greater share of educated
population (and labour force) than Peloponnese (Table 6). Moreover, while Crete and
Thessaly have increased, in the 1971-91 period, their share in the national population
with post-secondary education, Peloponnese has not (Table 5). Overall, Tables 5 and
6 indicate a highly unequal regional distribution of human capital, as measured by
presence of individuals with post-secondary education, with Attiki's dominating the
three regions. The three regions under examination have had different rates of success
in maintaining (or attracting) high quality human resources. This observation takes
into consideration the fact that a substantial proportion of university graduates work
for the public sector, including state-owned enterprises, which is highly centralised in
Athens.
Table 7 shows that all three regions under study are characterised by a relatively low,
by Greek and EU standards, rates of urbanisation. The urban population as a share of
the total ranges from 35% to 44%, with the EU average at about 70%, suggesting
possibly little scope for local agglomeration economies. Rural population is still
higher than the urban one in Peloponnese and Crete, and urban population has grown
relatively slowly during the last two decades.21
Table 7: Urban vs. Rural Distribution of Population, 1971-91
urban semi-urban rural
Thessaly 1971 35.8 15.8 48.4
1991 43.6 16.4 40.0
Peloponnese 1971 29.8 12.4 57.8
1991 35.9 14.6 49.5
Crete 1971 33.5 10.7 55.8
1991 41.5 12.3 46.2
Greece 1971 53.2 11.7 35.1
1991 58.8 12.8 28.4
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Regional Statistics.
Table 8: Share of population Living in Plains, Semi-mountainous and Mountainous
Areas
plain semi-mountainous. mountainous
Thessaly 1971 67.9 13.2 18.9
1991 72.8 12.3 14.9
Peloponnese 1971 59.5 22.3 18.2
1991 64.3 19.6 16.1
Crete 1971 58.3 19.8 21.9
1991 64.2 18.7 17.1
Greece 1971 67.7 20.3 12.0
1991 69.0 21.8 9.2
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Regional Statistics.
Tables 8 and 9 present the distribution of regional area and population in plains, semi-
mountainous and mountainous areas. Clearly, Table 8 shows that the population has
moved over time to the plains in all regions. Despite that, semi-mountainous and
mountainous areas still maintain a significant share of the population, which to some
extent explains the importance of agriculture in all those regions. Among the three
regions, Thessaly has the highest share of population living in plains, while Crete has
the higher share of population living in mountainous areas. As Table 9 shows, the
share of mountainous land is very high in all regions. In Peloponnese, 80 percent of
the land is mountainous and semi-mountainous, and the figure for Crete is 77 percent.
Thessaly is in a relatively better situation with 37 percent of land being in plains.
 Two more characteristics concerning the spatial distribution of economic activity
within the three regions deserve mention. First, the urban systems in each of those
regions differ considerably. Thessaly has two relatively large urban centres of about
150 thousand people each (the 5
th and 6
th in the national ranking) and two smaller
cities with about 50 and 30 thousand each, respectively. Several towns of about 10
thousand each make up the remainder of its urban system.
Table 9: Share of Land Characterised as Plains, Semi-mountainous and Mountainous
Plain Semi-mountainous Mountainous
Peloponnese 19.9 30.0 50.0
Thessaly 37.0 17.4 45.6
Crete 22.7 27.9 49.4
Greece 28.7 29.0 42.3
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Regional Statistics.22
Peloponnese lacks an urban centre of size comparable to that of Thessaly's. Its largest
city has no more than 50 thousand people (15
th in the national rank), while there are
another 4 cities with populations ranging from 10 to 30 thousand. Most of its
population lives in very small cities and villages. Crete falls somewhere between
Thessaly and Peloponnese. It has a large urban centre of about 150 thousand (the 4
th
in the national rank), a second with a population of about 60 thousand, and 2-3 more
with populations ranging from 10-25 thousand people. The rest of the population lives
in very small cities or villages. Low rates of urbanisation and few relatively large
cities have  -- as we have already seen -- consequences for the composition of human
capital.
The second noteworthy spatial feature is that Thessaly and Peloponnese are
characterised by geographical divides. Crete has a relatively more balanced structure.
In Thessaly, the eastern part is more urbanised, more industrialised and more
developed. The western part is more mountainous, rural, less industrialised and less
developed. The two largest urban centres are in the eastern part. The northern part of
Peloponnese, which is close to Athens, is more developed, industrialised and densely
populated. The central and southern parts are more rural, and less developed. The
more urbanised part of the region is in a short distance from Athens and in many
respects a satellite.
A final comment concerns the distance of the three regions from the major economic
centres of the country and from international markets. Peloponnese is closest to
Athens (the largest national market) than the other two regions. Especially its northern
and most developed part could be considered to be at an advantage with respect to
proximity to markets. Several industries from Attiki have crossed the regional border
and located in the northern part of Peloponnese in order to combine benefits of
investment incentives (which are not available in Athens) with a short distance to the
metropolis. This prompts two remarks.  First, proximity and differences in productive
structures have produced a centre-periphery pattern, where Athens successfully
invades and exploits the local market of the most urbanised part of the region. Second,
the region is far from international markets, as all transportation routes must cross
either Italy or the Balkans to reach Western European markets. The existence in the
southern part of the region of a civilian airport with regular flights to Athens has not
so far worked out as a major transport link. It is therefore likely that Peloponnese
stands to benefit from the PATHE Project, a new highway link from Patras to the
country's northern border.
Thessaly lies in the middle of Greece. Depending on where one starts from, it is about
3-4 driving hours away from Athens and 2-3 hours away from Thessaloniki. These
distances may have exceeded a threshold, allowing the development of two large
urban centres and a significant industrial base. The eastern part of Thessaly is crossed
by the main north-south national highway, providing relatively good access to the
large markets of Athens and Thessaloniki. Access to the western and northwestern
part of Greece, however, is limited due to poor east-west transportation links, and a
mountain range separating eastern from western Greece. Another disadvantage of the
region is that despite its size, urban population and export potential, it lacks a major
airport.23
Crete is an island quite isolated from the mainland. This has, on the one hand, led to a
relative autonomy of its regional market and, on the other, prompted an early search
for policies to overcome isolation. As a result, in addition to an effective system of sea
links with Athens, Thessaloniki and other major islands, Crete already has two
airports with scheduled domestic and international passenger and cargo flights, and
numerous international charter flights during the tourist season. Exporters of
agricultural products use air freight with an increasing frequency. Therefore, Crete has
found ways to overcome considerably its distance from the mainland, and to improve
its access to major domestic and international markets. The two airports have
facilitated, along with a more favourable climate permitting an extended tourist
season from May to October, the rapid development of international tourism, the main
economic activity of the island.
Overall, geography, morphology and transport infrastructure have affected in different
ways the three regions. Geography would seem to confer Peloponnese an advantage
with respect to the Athens metropolitan market, and Thessaly an advantage in the
sense of being a central place in Greece. Territorial morphology and poor transport
infrastructure, however, limit these advantages for the southern part of Peloponnese
and the western part of Thessaly, those regions’ less developed areas. Nonetheless,
Crete seems to have developed effective transportation links and thus has overcome
its geographic isolation.
Several studies have utilised the concepts of population potential and gravity index to
examine the spatial structure of Greece. Using the MNE (1993) figures at the
prefecture level for 1888 and computing regional averages, we find that Thessaly has
a gravity index figure that is about 25% higher than that of Peloponnese and about
55% higher than that of Crete.
C. Sectoral Analysis
Table 10 presents the structure of the economy of the three regions by sector in 1997.
The figures for Greece, O1Rs and the EU are also reported. We observe that all three
regions have a greater share of employment in agriculture and a lower share of
employment in industry and services than the Greek, the O1Rs and the EU averages.
Peloponnese has the greatest dependence on agriculture and Crete has the highest
share of employment in services.
Table 11 reports the number of industrial firms and their turnover in 1994 for the three
regions. We note that Thessaly has by far the largest industrial base, followed by
Crete. Thessaly has also the largest average firm size estimated by turnover per firm.
Peloponnese comes second in terms of size, despite its low firm density, because of
the relatively more industrialised northern part, which is close to Athens.
Table 10: Share of Employment in Selected Greek and  O1Rs by sector, 1997
Thessaly Peloponnese Crete Greece EU15 O1R
Agriculture 38.6 43.4 37.8 19.8 5.0 10.8
Industry 17.4 16.9 12.5 22.5 29.5 27.5
Services 44.0 39.7 49.8 57.7 65.6 61.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and24
Development of Regions in the European Union, 1999











Thessaly 2,571 298,495 3.5 116.1
Peloponnese 1,594 184,446 2.4 115.7
Crete 2,305 205,808 4.2 89.3
Greece 51,190 10,720,410 4.9 209.4
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Regional Statistics
Electricity consumption for industrial use per capita, which is reported in Figure 12
and is based on Table 4B in Appendix B, is a good measure of each region’s industrial
base. While household electricity consumption can be used asa a proxy measure of
welfare, electricity consumption for industrial use per capita can be used as a proxy
for capital (industrial base) and, in a sense, for the size of firms. We observe that
Thessaly has an industrial base made up of  relatively larger firms, than Crete. The
declining trend for Thessaly indicates that the de-industrialisation crisis in late 1980s
and early 1990s hit harder larger firms, which are more likely to be exposed to
international competition. Despite that, Thessaly still maintains a sizable productive
base in industry, mainly concentrated in the two large urban centres in the eastern part
of the region, which also lie on the main north-south transportation axis. A similar














































































decline is also apparent in Peloponnese, as its northern and more industrialised part
has also been affected (but to a lesser degree than Thessaly) by industrial decline. On
the other hand, the industrial base of Crete seems to be made up of relatively smaller
firms, whose growth over time depends on developing successful forward linkages
with tourism and backward linkages with agriculture. The latter pattern seems to be
missing in Peloponnese and, to some extent, in Thessaly, as well.25
Table 12 provides information about the number of enterprises and their turnover in
trade and services in 1994. Crete appears clearly in these figures to be a service
economy with a larger number of firms in trade and services, a larger turnover, more
firms per 1000 residents and considerably higher turnover by firm than the other two
regions. This difference may be related to the development of tourism.









Thessaly 2,821 112,989 3.81 40.05
Peloponnese 2,424 82,050 3.68 33.85
Crete 3,609 285,024 6.56 78.98
Greece 49,913 6,947,398 4.79 139.19
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Regional Statistics
Figures 13 and 14 (based on Table 5B in Appendix B) show the tourist capacity of the
three regions and the levels of international tourism in the period 1981-1997. We see
that Crete has a substantially higher capacity per 100 inhabitants than the other two
regions and the whole of Greece. Large-scale investment in tourism has taken
advantage of good climatic conditions (a prolonged summer session), sunny beaches,
clean waters and picturesque villages and transformed the island to an international
summer resort. Peloponnese also attracts foreign tourism, but at levels that are not
very different in comparison with other regions. Tourism here depends on a
combination of sea-resort summer vacation and trips to ancient monuments. The latter
however, is run typically from outside the region (Athens) and involves mainly daily
trips from Athens. Available accommodations here differ from Crete, in that they are
provided mostly by small-scale family-run businesses (rooms to let) that offer limited
services and recreation facilities. Thessaly's tourism is primarily domestic, as it lacks
the advantages of a prolonged summer season and the existence of historical
monuments of the same attractiveness as Peloponnese. Moreover, its accommodations
are largely organised on a small-scale family run basis.

























































































































Summing up, the economic structures of the three regions differ in important ways.
Thessaly is relatively more industrial, with more and relatively larger firms. Its
industry has, however, gone through a crisis, as many firms belonging to sectors that
have been under severe pressure at either the national or the EU levels have been hit,
including, in particular, textiles, metallurgy, clothing, and automobiles. Thessaly's
potential in agriculture has not been fully explored. Plain lands in the east are used
intensively for growing industrial crops. Mountainous western Thessaly grows olive
trees, and raises sheep and cattle. Overall, there appears to be little scope for further
cost improvements. Local incomes can only improve from the processing of local
inputs through forward linkages with industry. There is little local integration of
activities. In most cases, local agricultural products are exported to other regions or
countries as raw materials.
Peloponnese has to a certain extent similar, but more acute, problems. Due to the
region's territorial morphology, agriculture in the central and southern part is mostly
dependent on extensive activities (olives and sheep raising). Only the northern plains
specialise in citrus fruit production, which is a labour-intensive activity. Therefore,
soil and morphology determine to a large extent the type of activities and the type of
technology used, making cost-related improvements unlikely. As in the case of
Thessaly, local processing of agricultural products – which would increase local value
added – is very limited. Industry in this region is mostly concentrated in the north,
while the southern and central parts of the region house small traditional units
basically serving local demand. With the exception of firms serving the needs of the
Athens metropolitan area, the industrial export base of the region is limited. As we
discussed in Section 2.B above, a serious impediment to further industrial
development is the lack of urban services, as the cities of the region have not grown
during the last 3-4 decades, perhaps because of the agglomeration shadow of Athens,
maintaining very small sizes that are not conducive to industrial development.
Finally, Crete is the region with the most favourable structural characteristics. The
main industry of the island is tourism, which is organised in a more efficient way and
offers a great variety of recreational opportunities and services, as well as high quality
accommodations. The other two sectors either serve local demand, or feed the tourist
industry with local inputs. Crete presents the best available – although far from ideal –27
example of forward and backward linkages among sectors and the best available
example of regionally integrated economy.
5. REGIONAL POLICIES IN GREECE
Regional policy in Greece has undergone important changes in the 1980s and the
1990s. Notable among them are the enactment of investment incentives laws, the
institution of the Integrated Mediterranean Programs (IMPs) and the Community
Support Frameworks (CSFs), and a serious attempt to decentralise public
administration and to improve the institutional framework under which regional
policy is implemented.
A. Institutional Framework of Public Administration
Historically, Greece has been characterised by a highly centralised system of public
administration. All important decisions about the allocation of funds, the provision of
regional infrastructure and the financial or other incentives provided, have been made
centrally by the national government in Athens.
Regional administration (the NUTS II level) did not exist prior to the mid 1980s,
when its introduction was instigated by the need to implement and monitor the
Operational Programs of the CSFs that had a spatial dimension. The heads of the
regional administration units are appointed by the national government, while the
regional councils – mainly advisory bodies – are made up of local public officials,
such as Prefects, Majors and representatives of professional organisations. Despite
local participation, regional administration is not really an autonomous layer of
government, but rather a branch of the central government administration, with a
specific mission related to the CSF Regional Operational Programs.
Prefectural Administration (the NUTS III level, nomoi) was until 1994 also a branch
of the central administration, with Prefects appointed by the government. Since 1994,
the Prefect and the Prefectural Council are elected in local elections, and in that sense
they do comprise a new form of local government. This institutional change should be
seen as a positive development towards governmental decentralisation. However,
many unresolved issues, including the division of responsibilities and above all
intergovernmental fiscal relations, generate tensions among the different levels of
public administration and limit the potential contribution of local administration to
promotion of local and regional development.
The bottom layer of administration is that of the urban units, that is cities, towns and
villages (NUTS V). This is the oldest form of local administration in Greece, with
Mayors and City councils being traditionally elected by their constituencies to
administer the local provision of public services and infrastructure. This level is the
most experienced and best funded.  However, its ability to deal with local problems
has been hampered, until recently, by the existence of numerous villages with very
small populations ranging from 100 to 500 residents. Problems of fragmentation and
ineffectiveness of the lower level administration have been addressed by recent28
legislation (the Kapodistrias Project), that imposed compulsory consolidation of small
municipalities (in close proximity to one another) into larger administrative units, and
was met, of course, by fierce opposition.
In sum, certain aspects of public administration in Greece are crucial for the
effectiveness of regional policy. First, despite recent efforts to decentralise, the
regional administrative structure continues to remain concentrated, as the lower levels
of administration are either appointed by the central government, or are dependent on
it financially. Second, local government is both under funded and highly fragmented.
There are too many small prefectures with a population of about 100-200 thousand
people.  Even if many problems, such as funding and jurisdictional and legislative
conflicts, had been addressed, public administration would still not be very effective,
as it lacks sufficient scale to ensure efficient provision of public goods and to
implement local development policies. Moreover, in prefectures that contain large
urban centres, there is no clear division of jurisdictions between the Mayor and the
Prefect. Because of these problems, there is vocal support in the country in favour of a
new round of administrative reform, which should reduce the number of
administrative units at both the NUTS II and NUTS III level. More specifically, it is
argued that the number of prefectures should be reduced to about 30 (from 51, at
present) and the number of Regions should be reduced to about 6-7 (from 13, at
present).
Despite these problems, Greece has experienced, during in the 1990s, significant
initiatives aiming at mobilising local resources and fostering growth, at both regional
and local levels. Several prefectures, regions, or even municipalities designed
development plans intended to draw on local strengths and to address restructuring of
their local economic base, combating unemployment and promoting new business
creation. Of course, several of those plans were rather naïve, and lacked realistic
objectives and clear policy instruments. Nonetheless, the fact that local initiative was
mobilised to a fairly large extent and in a far more organised manner than ever before
augurs well for the future.
B. Transportation Infrastructure
Several attempts have been made to evaluate regional infrastructure policies in
Greece. Several papers [ Louri (1985), MNE (1993), Petrakos et al. (1993) ] report
evidence that better infrastructure is associated with higher levels of development.
Petrakos and Saratsis (1999), however, investigated the impact of the initial level of
regional transport infrastructure on the rate of growth  of GRP per capita and found no
significant effect. These seemingly contradictory results may be reconciled as follows.
The existence of good infrastructure may be associated with higher levels of
development, but it does not ensure further improvement, since this depends on
additional economic and structural factors.
It is often noted [ CEC (1986) ] that infrastructure constitutes a necessary, though not
sufficient, precondition for regional development. However, neither the European nor
the Greek evidence points to impressive regional impact of infrastructure investment.
Vickerman et al. (1999), for example, observe that regional development policies
aimed at creation of infrastructure in lagging regions have not been very successful in29
reducing regional disparities in Europe.  Moreover, adverse effects are also possible.
Improved transportation networks linking large urban centres may intensify
disparities, as it is easier for producers in centrally located regions to invade
peripheral markets previously protected by remoteness  [ Krugman (1991), Vickerman
et al. (1999) ]. Such effects may also materialise in Greece, once the EU-financed
transportation networks, currently under construction, have been completed.
Specifically, large transportation projects under way are likely to have impacts on the
the three regions we are studying. They will improve the accessibility of central and
southern Peloponnese to Athens and to the rest of Greece, and the accessibility of
(western mainly) Thessaly to Athens and Thessaloniki. Although these projects are
expected to contribute to the national economy, it is not clear whether they will
eventually have favourble impacts on all of the regional economies involved, at least
according to what one would expect according to new economic geography [Krugman
and Venables (1995)].
In contrast, the evidence is more favourable for other types of public infrastructure
policies. Vagionis and Spence (1994) have found that the designated industrial areas
6
were successful in promoting employment, while Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) have
found that public spending on infrastructure has a positive impact on new
manufacturing firm formation. However, a direct test of the regional impact of
infrastructure investment on manufacturing output, performed by Lambrinidis  et al.
(1998), did not yield any statistically significant results.
C. Regional Investment Incentives
The institutional framework for public assistance to business investment in Greece is
currently provided by Law 2601/98 of 1998, which amended Law 1262/82 of 1982
and Law 1892/90 of 1990. The basic intention of this legislation is to provide
assistance for new investment projects. This assistance includes grants, loans, interest
subsidies and tax allowances that are granted to successful applicants in a manner that
depends on plant location. Firms wishing to invest in Athens or Thessaloniki receive
in most cases practically no assistance. The further away an investment project is
located from the metropolitan centres and the country’s “development axis”, the more
generous are the subsidies and other support provided. The country is divided in four
support zones, designated by A to D, and each prefecture is assigned to one of these
zones. Zone A, which includes Athens and Thessaloniki, is not favoured, and Zone D
is most favoured.
This legislation defines eligibility for assistance in terms of a number of criteria, that
is in addition to location. Investment projects qualify if they exceed a minimum size,
take place in certain particular sectors of the economy (initially industry and
mechanised agriculture, but in the latest legislation services and trade were also
included), and satisfy certain conditions in terms of production processes adopted
(new technologies, environmental protection, etc.) and of new employment positions
                                                       
6 Industrial zones at the outskirts of large cities provide special location incentives and are equipped
with such essential infrastructures as road, sewage and telecommunication networks.30
created. Provisions are also made for support to incoming foreign direct investment,
and, perhaps surprisingly, to foreign investments made by Greek enterprises in Balkan
countries.
Several papers have attempted to examine the impact of investment incentives on
regional development. Louri (1985) and Petrakos et al. (1993) show that regional
investment incentives constitute the least important factor in attracting investment and
increasing employment, respectively. Petrakos and Tsoukalas (1997) conclude that
incentives can be effective in attracting investment only in combination with the
special facilities provided by designated Industrial Areas. Georgiou (1991) argues that
the influence of incentives on the redistribution of investment in favour of the most
heavily favoured areas was probably not decisive. Petrakos and Saratsis (1999)
reached similar results, as they found no evidence that higher regional investment
incentives lead to higher growth rates of GDP per capita. The failure of regional
investment incentives to promote development in favoured regions is apparent. The
regions most favoured by the incentives continue to be the least developed ones,
nearly 20 years after the introduction of the first comprehensive investment law, Law
1262/82. Even if the incentives do contribute to the creation of new jobs in those
regions, as reported by Vagionis and Spence (1994) for the 1980-88 period, it is by no
means certain that this will lead to faster economic growth.
Table 6B in the Appendix presents the classification of the Prefectures of Thessaly,
Peloponnese and Crete according to investment support zones they belong to, and the
assistance they receive for investment projects. This table shows that the most
favoured region among the three we are studying is Peloponnese, which has most
prefectures in the highly subsidised Zones C and D. The least favoured region is
Thessaly, which has two of its prefectures (counting for more than 60% of the
population) in Zone B. Crete is between the other two. There is also a special category
with greater support than Zone D, which includes the region of Thrace, on in the
Greek-Turkish border.
Tables 13 and 14 present the sectoral and regional distribution of private investment
projects that have received assistance by Laws 1262/82, period 1982-1990, and
1892/90, period 1990-1995. We observe that during the first period, Crete was the
recipient of 13% of total investment at the national level, while Thessaly and
Peloponnese have received about 6% and 5%, respectively. We also observe that
investment activity in Crete is heavily concentrated in the tertiary sector of the
economy (tourism), accounting for 21% of the total investment made in this sector.
On the other hand, Peloponnese and Thessaly show a greater presence in the
secondary sector (manufacturing), accounting for about 7% of the total investment in
this sector. Note however, that Crete also has a significant presence in industry, taking
up more than 6% of total investment activity. In terms of the size of average
investment projects, we see that Crete attracts investment projects  that are larger than
the national average and nearly double in size than those in Thessaly and
Peloponnese. This is especially apparent in the tertiary sector. In the secondary sector
the picture is different, as larger industrial firms invests in Thessaly and smaller ones
in Crete. In the primary sector, Peloponnese has larger projects.31
The picture in the second period, 1990-1995, differs from that in the first in several
important ways. First, Thessaly received a higher share of total investment than Crete.
Peloponnese is still last in the list. Second, from the internal allocation of projects we
Table 13: Distribution of Private Investments, 1982-90 (Law1262/82)
Investments (regional shares)
primary secondary tertiary total
Greece 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Crete 4.58 6.43 21.15 13.09
Peloponnese 8.24 6.78 2.76 5.04
Thessaly 12.92 7.12 4.48 6.37
Investments (sectoral shares)
primary secondary tertiary total
Greece 8.10 45.65 46.25 100.00
Crete 2.84 22.43 74.73 100.00
Peloponnese 13.24 61.46 25.30 100.00
Thessaly 16.42 51.01 32.57 100.00
Average size of investments (Greece=100)
primary secondary tertiary total
Greece 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Crete 96.85 51.62 121.50 107.49
Peloponnese 100.06 74.46 58.92 63.66
Thessaly 63.94 89.58 64.42 63.73
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Greece
see that Crete focuses now more in industry than in services. Third, Thessaly has
managed to attract, in this period, relatively larger investment projects than the other
two regions, especially in industry and agriculture. Perhaps, the industrial decline that
Table 14: Distribution of Private Investments, 1990-95 (Law.1892/90)
Investments (regional share)
primary secondary tertiary total
Greece 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Crete 4.98 3.82 14.16 5.80
Peloponnese 5.53 3.71 3.82 3.80
Thessaly 9.37 6.99 3.22 6.36
Investments (sectoral share)
primary secondary tertiary total
Greece 3.43 77.83 18.74 100.00
Crete 2.95 51.28 45.77 100.00
Peloponnese 5.00 76.14 18.87 100.00
Thessaly 5.06 85.47 9.47 100.00
Average size of investments (Greece=100)
primary secondary tertiary total
Greece 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Crete 134.22 68.08 114.14 85.52
Peloponnese 66.61 63.13 102.52 67.18
Thessaly 130.01 151.23 48.15 121.95
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Greece32
hit Thessaly in the late 1980s and early 1990s generated pressures for restructuring,
which have apparently been facilitated by the investment incentive laws and
especially their provisions for special assistance to industrially declining regions.
Overall, Crete, during period 1982-90, and Thessaly, during period 1990-95, attract
larger amounts of private investment than Peloponnese. Crete is preferred by services,
although a recent shift in favour of manufacturing is evident. Thessaly is  preferred by
industry and especially larger-scale industry, while Peloponnese attracts smaller-scale
industry. It is clear that the structure of investment incentives over those two periods
has not succeeded in directing more, nor larger, projects to Peloponnese, which is the
region furthest behind.
D. Investment Incentives and Regional Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment
There are only a few studies of the regional distribution of Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) in Greece. Papandos (1999) compiled data from the Ministry of National
Economy (MNE), for the period 1988-1991, and from the Hellenic Centre for
International Investment (ELKEDE, a newly established public service to foreign
investors interested in Greece), for years 1996-1998. The first set of data cover all
investment projects, while the second includes investment projects that have been
undertaken with the assistance of ELKEDE. Table 15 and 16 present the distribution
of FDI by year in the investment zones.
We note that during the 1988-1991 period the bulk of FDI went to Zone A, which
includes the Attiki and Thessaloniki prefectures, which, as we saw above, receive no
special assistance under the investment incentives legislation. During this period, the
regions of Thessaly, Peloponnese and Crete received less than 1% of FDI each. This
distribution is largely explained by the sectoral distribution of FDI, which includes
mostly services (such as banking and insurance) or trade. Unfortunately, the MNE has
not collected information on the spatial distribution of FDI in the period since 1991.
The only data available since 1991 are from ELKEDE, and include projects in which
the Centre itself had an active involvement.
Table 15. Distribution of inward FDI flows to investment zones, 1988-91
Year Zone
A B C D
1988 92% 5% 3% -
1989 58% 20% 22% -
1990 78% 22% - -
1991 87% 13% - -
Source: Papandos (1999), MNE (1994) and own calculation.
Although the two data sets are not comparable, some observations are useful. During
the last few years the border region of Thrace, a special border zone with higher
incentives than even Zone D, has attracted considerable investment activity. This must
be interpreted with caution, however. First, the investment projects reported by
ELKEDE do not include investments by some large investors (especially in the
banking sector), who obviously feel they do not need assistance in deciding where to
invest. Second, the magnitude of the annual FDI inflow in the 1988-91 period (as33
reported by MNE) is around 140 billion GDR, while the annual sums in the 1996-
1998 period (reported by ELKEDE) were around 30 billion GDR. This implies that
some sample selection bias is associated with the projects reported by ELKEDE,
which appear to be a special subset of inward FDI, that is concentrated in the
secondary sector.
Table 16. Distribution of selected inward FDI flows to investment zones, 1996-98
A B C Thrace
1996 - 21% 32% 47%
1997 33% 24% 7% 37%
1998 - 71% 29% -
Source: Papandos (1999) and ELKEDE (1998)
Overall, the data indicate that FDI (and especially projects attracted by the tertiary
sector of the economy – which are the majority) tend to concentrate primarily in the
Athens and Thessaloniki region. They also indicate that the particularly favourable
financial incentives granted to the region of Thrace start to pay off, by attracting some
international investment activity in industry, perhaps also because of the opening up
of Greece's northern borders. In any case, the regions of Thessaly
7, Peloponnese and
Crete do not seem to benefit significantly from FDI for two reasons.  First, FDI is
mainly associated with the tertiary sector (services, banking, insurance, trade), which
enjoys significant economies of agglomeration in Athens (and Thessaloniki). Second,
the incentives provided to the regions under study are perhaps insufficient to offset
either the disadvantages of non-metropolitan locations or the greater assistance
provided to Thrace.
E. Implementation of Integrated Mediterranean Projects and Community
Support Frameworks I and II
There is by now a baseline of information concerning the effectiveness of the
implementation of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes  (IMPs) and the
Community Support Frameworks (CSF) I and II in Greece. Georgiou (1994), who
examines implementation of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, claims that
they were stifled by serious administrative and institutional obstacles. These include
lack of know-how in planning techniques, dominance of a traditionally centralised
administrative apparatus, inadequate supervision and monitoring of the programmes
and political clientelism.
The implementation of the Community Support Framework I (1989-1993) for Greece
has been analysed by Economou (1997), Bougas (1994), Lyberaki (1996), and others.
CSF I was associated with a lower than desired impact on GDP growth in Greece, and
registered, in fact, the lowest impact among all EU countries with comparable
development problems and programmes. While the impact of CSF I on the annual
GDP growth rates of Spain, Portugal and Ireland is estimated at 0.7%, 1.0% and
                                                       
7 The Eastern part of Thessaly (Prefecture of Magnesia) has attracted some FDI, thanks to the special
incentives granted to it in 1996.34
0.7%, respectively, for Greece it is only 0.3%. These differences are despite the fact
that the EU contributions per head for Greece were comparable to those for Portugal,
and greater than those for Spain.
Factors that might explain the failure of CSF I to have a substantial impact on GDP
growth in Greece include, first, the fact that the operational programmes of the CSF I
were actually not much more than mere lists of unrelated programs, that were selected
by clientist political processes. Second, the programs were dominated by small
projects. Such fragmentation satisfied political needs or popular demand, but had only
marginal economic effects. Third, several of the projects had small budgets and
remained incomplete after the end of the Programme, having neither economic nor
functional impact. Finally, "soft" initiatives, networks, innovative actions and
supportive services that encourage synergies and joint efforts were largely absent
from the IMP and the CSF I
8.
Another important issue is often the lack of clear policy objectives at the regional
level. KEPE (1997) reports that in several instances the CSF cofinanced Regional
Operational Programs (ROP) that were implemented had neither a clear set of goals
nor a clear set of policies to achieve them. As a result, the various policies and
programmes have a limited economic impact.
Table 7B in the Appendix presents the allocation of CSF II funds to the three regions
under examination. We note, however, that only 30% of the CSF II funds for the
1994-99 period were allocated directly to the 13 Greek regions. The remaining 70%
were allocated via multi-sectoral national-level Operational Programmes that included
very large public projects, which in several cases (including notably the Athens Metro
and several major highways) favoured Athens. We see that each region receives a
share that is roughly equal to its share in the national population, with Thessaly and
Crete being slightly favoured in terms of per capita figures
9.
We also note that each region exhibited a different mix of priorities in development
policies. Crete put more emphasis on policies related to infrastructure projects (23%
of the total ROP budget), Peloponnese to tourism (20% of the budget), and Thessaly
to development of human resources (19% of the budget). In general, infrastructure
and human resources development policies followed by policies related to tourism and
rural development take a large share of the ROP projects of the three regions.
                                                       
8 To be fair, there is ample scope for learning by doing and catching up in the implementation of the
CSFs in Greece. CSF II is estimated by the European Commission to have a significantly higher impact
on GDP growth (~1%) than CSF I (~0.3%) and a better internal structure. Unfortunately, its impact on
regional disparities in Greece has not been discerned yet.
9 Differences in per capita figures are also found among the three regions in the allocation of the
Programme of Public Investment (PPI) funds. Although PPI funds are supposedly allocated to regions
according to "objective criteria," such as population or level of development [ Labrinidis et al. (1998),
KEPE (1997) ], Table 8B in the Appendix shows that the regions under examination have significantly
different figures per capita. Among the three regions, Crete receives consistently a higher share of PPI
funds, while Peloponnese receives in most years a relatively lower share than Thessaly. These
differences may arise either from public pressure or political pressure or simply be due a region's faster
rate of fund absorption, which mechanically justifies additional funding.35
One needs to be cautious in interpreting some of these general categories, as project
selection is occasionally unrelated to the needs and capabilities of the regions. In
several instances, programmes were dictated by the European Commission and had
not been adapted to local conditions. For example, some programmes related to the
development of human resources may be severely criticised as being inappropriate.
While this does not apply to funds provided for infrastructure at all levels of education
(especially post-secondary), many programmes, especially those aimed at vocational
training have faced serious delays in implementation. Moreover, it is now openly
acknowledged that some vocational and training programmes cannot effectively deal
with the needs of the unemployed, unless they are an integral part of a specific
development strategy for each region.
Crete has reportedly designed its ROPs in a relatively more effective and coherent
way than Thessaly, while those of the Peloponnese have been criticised as being
vague and lacking specific goals [ KEPE (1997) ]. At the implementation level, a
recent report [ EC (1999c) ] suggests that Crete and Thessaly are among the regions
that have done best in this connection (along with Attiki), while Peloponnese is
experiencing delays in certain parts of its Regional Operational Program. The Greek
experience provides ample support for the notion that planning for development at the
regional level depends critically on the quality of planning know-how and on the
quality of human resources, that are employed by regional and local administration
and are engaged in the planning process. It also requires a deep understanding of the
forces and function of regional agglomerations in the Greek economy, which is in
agreement with the basic conclusion of Thisse (2000).
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper has established a baseline of information for understanding the economic
performance of the regions of Greece. We have stayed away from factors that go
beyond economics and geography broadly construed. Perhaps, as we are about to
conclude, it is appropriate to venture briefly into history. Crete, Peloponnese and
Thessaly, the three regions that the paper has focused on, do have regional identities
of their own that go fairly far back in history. They are not mere administrative
subdivisions. Their feudal pasts share the characteristic of being shaped by the clash
of East and West, arguably more than all other regions of Greece. Peloponnese is one
of the founding regions of the modern Greek State, Thessaly joined Greece fifty years
later in 1878, and Crete joined Greece in the early 1900s. All this was the outcome of
successful wars with the Ottoman Empire. Perhaps because of the unifying role of a
common language and culture, the sequence in which those regions joined Greece
does not allow one to predict their relative economic standing. Quite on the contrary,
their relative economic performance reflects the extreme centralisation of the Greek
State.
The literature we have reviewed has identified a number of factors in operation that
have influenced the prospects of Greece for balanced regional development. A first
finding points towards a possibly adverse impact of European integration on the
regional industrial base of Greece. This has become apparent in regions with
concentrations of larger (by Greek standards) industrial enterprises. The cases of
Thessaly and other regions, which have experienced de-industrialisation in recent36
years, including the closure of a significant number of large enterprises, suggest that
the process of economic integration might have had most pronounced effects upon
significant regional concentrations of manufacturing activity. Although similar
tendencies are also apparent in Attiki and to some extent in Thessaloniki as well, the
rapid increase of the tertiary sector of those two metropolitan areas has helped offset
possible impact on employment, which was not the case in at least some of the
regions.
A second finding concerns the dependence of regional inequality on the business
cycle. This finding explains at least part of regional convergence patterns during a
decade of industrial recession in the Greek economy. It also implies that economic
recovery begins mainly in the major centres of economic activity and does not diffuse
automatically to the periphery. This generates a policy problem that is hard to tackle,
as the efforts aiming at national convergence to EU-average levels may be
accompanied by undesirable increases in disparities among the regions of the country.
A third finding concerns the characteristics of those regions, which have in the past
done relatively better. The evidence shows that a critical share of manufacturing and
presence of capital intensive enterprises, of high quality human resources and of
natural resources suitable for the development of tourism, are factors conducive to
regional growth.
While these findings apply generally, our specific analysis of the characteristics of
Crete, Peloponnese and Thessaly, the three regions under examination, revealed a
number of additional factors that have contributed to differences in performance
among the three regions. Initial conditions with respect to geography and climate may
have lasting effects on the structural characteristics of the economies of regions,
which is in agreement with the notion, recently reaffirmed by the new economic
geography, that regional economic development is to some extent a path-dependent
process. Geography is clearly a major influence on the distribution of activity among
and within the regions of Greece that we have studied. It appears that distance from
Athens has enabled Thessaly and Crete to offset the “curse” of proximity to the
Athens agglomeration and to develop minimum urban infrastructure. This is not the
case for the Peloponnese, whose markets have been overshadowed by Athens.
Limited access to EU markets is a serious impediment to any effort to develop export
bases, especially in traditional sectors and products in which competition with the
other southern European countries is strong.
The analysis has raised an interesting issue with respect to the role of geography in
economic development. Although distance from the major world markets is always a
disadvantage [ Gallup et al. (1998) ], proximity can be considered an advantage only
under specific conditions. That is, by applying the results of  Krugman and Venables
(1995) in a regional context, we can argue that proximity to large markets (or
metropolitan regions) facilitates growth only if differences in development levels and
structures are not too pronounced. Otherwise, it leads to a penetration of product
markets by the more dynamic enterprises of the more advanced region. These
differences may explain why Peloponnese has failed to take advantage of its
proximity to Athens, but Athens has taken advantage of its proximity to Peloponnese.37
Lack of spatial and sectoral integration of the economy at the regional and national
levels appears also to be hampering performance. As noted before, the process of
economic growth has been known, in general, to be associated with increasing
regional disparities, because linkage effects between metropolis and periphery are
poorly developed. Finally, policies (or the lack of policies) have played a role. The
success of Crete in overcoming geographical isolation, by developing effective
transportation and by taking advantage of its potential in tourism is a noteworthy
lesson. The failure of Peloponnese to fully exploit its historical heritage as a tourism
resource is probably due to poorly designed or implemented policies. It is an open
question whether policies can completely offset market forces. Despite receiving less
assistance than other regions, Crete has attracted a significantly higher share of
investment projects.
Table 17 illustrates these points in a qualitative fashion. Ranking the three regions in a
relative scale of 1 to 3 with respect to a number of factors that include initial
conditions, market processes and policies, gives an overall score that closely tracks
the performance of the regions with respect to per capita GDP levels.
Table 17. Factors influencing the performance of the regions
Factors Influencing performance Relative Rating
Thessaly Peloponnese Crete
Population growth ** * ***
Human Capital ** * ***
Economic structure (dependence on agriculture) ** * ***
Agriculture (traditional/extensive or mechanized/intensive) *** * **
Agriculture locally processed (forward linkages) ** * ***
Industry (small scale local or large scale export base) *** ** *
Services (tourism) * ** ***
Tourism with backward linkages to local industry ** * ***
Climate (favouring extended tourist season) * ** ***
Overall degree of regional integration of activities ** * ***
Morphology *** * **
Level of urbanization *** * **
Existence of large cities over 100.000 people *** * **
Attractiveness to private investment ** * ***
Accessibility to Athens ** *** *
Gravity index ** * ***
Investment support policies ** *** *
Strategic transport infrastructure – facilities * ** ***
Public investment program allocation ** * ***
Allocation of CSF II funds in the regions ** * ***
Implementation of CSF policies ** * ***
Research Institution and Universities ** * ***
OVERALL RATING ** * ***
*** Highest relative rating
*     Lowest relative rating
Although this scoring method is rather crude, and alternative rankings (such as
including different factors or assigning special weights to the most important of them)
would affect results, the relative ranking is telling. Peloponnese rarely receives the top38
ranking (three stars) and Crete rarely receives the bottom ranking (one star). Thessaly
is in an in-between position, often nearer the top rather than the bottom of the scale.
Table 17 summarises our basic argument. Policy matters for determining development
outcomes, but so do initial conditions related to geography, morphology and
economic structure, as well as market forces. Moreover, policies that are designed and
implemented at the local level may even cause regional disparities to grow, as locally
available human resources, know-how and experience with regional development may
favour the more advanced and wealthier regions.
Regional policies implemented the last two decades have not succeeded in reversing
the highly concentrated pattern of spatial development in Greece. Yet, despite – or
because of – all these conditions, the role of regional policy in Greece is today as
important as ever. Perhaps, we have learned three lessons from the Greek experience.
First, regional spending must be sensitive to the needs and special circumstances of
regions. Second, regional policy must enhance the capabilities of local governments
and civic organisations to exercise initiative and to design and implement
development plans that accommodate creativity and innovation. And third, regional
policy will probably not succeed unless governmental administrative structures of
Greece are reformed, by the design of more efficient administrative units and by the
improvement of the human resources available to local and regional administration.
This would likely have major consequences for the design, implementation and
evaluation of the Regional Programs of the Third Community Support Framework,
which is by far the largest source of funds to have been made available for regional
development so far. The challenge for Greece is to modernise in ways which would
make judicious use of its human and natural resources and not exacerbate further its
regional disparities. The challenge for regions that have so far been relatively
successful is to provide the foundations for sustained growth in the years to come.
Addressing the broader questions associated with regional policy requires a better
understanding of the specific economic magnitudes and parameters that characterise
the behaviour of individuals and firms and their responses to policy variables. The
extent of their importance is highlighted by the examples developed by Matsuyama
and Takahashi (1998) and the chances for policy to offset  “self-defeating” regional
concentration. Thisse (2000) argues persuasively that the design of regional policy
must account creatively for the underlying economic fundamentals that are
responsible for perceived “regional imbalances.” In a second best world, some
regional imbalances are inevitable, and others are desirable.
 In addition to the problems we have already identified, the design of regional policy
in the Greek context would be facilitated by a better understanding of regional forces
in personal income determination in Greece. Such questions may be addressed by
combining regional and sectoral data with microeconomic data. Such analyses have
yet to be conducted in Greece.39
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APPENDIX A: REGIONAL INEQUALITIES IN THE PERIOD 1971-91 (NUTS
III LEVEL)
Table 1A and Figure 1A present indicators of inequality in welfare for the NUTS III
regions of Greece (prefectures), as measured by: (a) GDP per capita by prefecture, at
fixed 1970 prices; (b) the number of private cars per 1.000 inhabitants; (c) household
consumption of electricity per inhabitant; and, (d) telephones per 1.000 inhabitants for
the years 1971, 1981 and 1991. Based on this information a number of interesting
observations can be made about the evolution of regional inequalities in Greece.




Variables 1971 1981 1991 1971 1981 1991
GDP per capita 0.24 0.24 0.19 3.37 3.44 2.49
Private cars per
1000 inh.





0.75 0.33 0.24 20.32 5.60 2.80
Telephones per 1000
inh.
0.53 0.34 0.24 8.03 5.27 3.08
Source: Petrakos and Saratsis (1999).
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Figure 2 The Evolution of the coefficient of variation of the GDP per capita in Greece
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Given that the coefficient of variation and the max/min ratio are both indicators
independent of units of measurement, their values are directly comparable for
different time periods as well as among different variables measuring welfare. The
first observation to be made based on the data presented is that both indicators show a
decline in regional inequalities over time, for all variables. We also observe that the
indicators of inequality show great differences among the four variables, mainly at the
beginning of the time period, and that they decrease over time at different rates. In
1971, the greatest differences occur in the variables cars per 1.000 inhabitants
10 and
household electricity consumption per capita. Inequalities according to GDP per
capita are noticeably smaller. The decrease in the coefficient of variation and the
max/min ratio for “GDP per capita” is relatively small in comparison with the change
in the other indicators of prosperity, a fact that raises doubts about the reliability of
regional GDP statistics
11.
We also note that, while in 1971 a limited number of prefectures are above the
average of the country’s prosperity indicators, this picture changes significantly in
1981 and 1991 for  GDP per capita and telephones per 1.000 inhabitants, although not
for the other two indicators. The distribution of electricity consumption per inhabitant
as well as that of private cars per 1.000 inhabitants is such that a limited number of
                                                       
10 The indicator of cars per 1000 inhabitants is probably overestimated since it does not include farm
vehicles, which are widely in the agricultural regions as general means of transportation.
11 One obvious problem with regional GDP statistics in Greece is the size of the black market, which is
estimated to be around 30 percent of the real economic activity but is unevenly concentrated in the
largest and most developed areas. A second problem is that regional GDP is measured on the basis of
where output is produced, not where income is received. This causes particular problems of
mismeasurement  of income affecting Athens especially.47
prefectures exceed the national average. Despite the decrease in inequalities in 1991,
the prefecture with the highest welfare indicator still exhibits two-and-one half times
greater GDP per inhabitant than the one with the lowest prosperity indicator.48
APPENDIX B:
REGIONAL STATISTICS FOR CRETE, PELOPONNESE AND THESSALY
Table 1B: GDP per head (in PPS) in Objective 1 regions (EU=100), 1988-96
Thessaly Peloponnese Crete Greece Obj.1
1988 54 58 57 58 63
1989 57 57 64 59 64
1990 54 55 61 57 64
1991 56 56 62 58 65
1992 56 56 64 60 65
1993 57 57 68 64 68
1994 59 58 71 65 69
1995 60 58 72 66 69
1996 61 58 72 68 69
Source: Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of Regions in
the European Union, 1999
Table 2B: Unemployment rates in Objective 1 regions, 1988-97
Thessaly Peloponnese Crete Greece EU15 Obj. 1
1988 6.9 5.8 3.5 7.7 9.0 15.6
1989 6.5 4.8 2.4 6.7 8.3 14.5
1990 7.0 5.2 2.2 6.3 7.7 13.5
1991 6.2 5.0 3.6 6.9 8.2 13.3
1992 7.3 7.3 3.3 7.8 9.2 13.9
1993 7.2 5.8 3.5 8.6 10.7 14.9
1994 6.9 6.3 3.8 8.8 11.2 16.2
1995 7.6 6.0 4.1 9.1 10.7 15.9
1996 7.6 6.4 3.4 9.7 10.8 16.3
1997 7.5 7.5 4.3 9.6 10.7 16.2
Source: Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of Regions in
the European Union, 1999
Table 3B: Employment change and productivity in Objective 1 regions
Thessaly Peloponnese Crete Greece Obj. 1 EU15
Employment
change
1988-93 -0.6 0.0 2.4 1.1 0.1 0.1
1993-97 3.0 -0.3 1.1 1.4 0.4 0.2
Labour
productivity
1988 62 64 64 67 76 100
1993 69 68 69 71 80 100
1996 68 67 72 72 82 100
Source: Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of Regions in
the European Union, 199949
Table 4B: Electricity consumption for industrial use (in MWh) per 100 inh.
Thessaly Peloponnese Crete Greece
1981 142.57 63.38 12.48 109.10
1982 139.39 64.98 11.73 105.38
1983 146.72 66.57 13.27 111.72
1984 161.45 57.60 12.25 115.06
1985 163.17 56.97 14.83 114.68
1986 171.96 46.58 16.09 113.60
1987 161.41 48.59 16.13 112.09
1988 165.27 52.75 17.44 122.57
1989 162.77 47.89 20.30 126.00
1990 156.41 46.69 20.19 123.76
1991 147.24 46.69 19.52 119.83
1992 133.23 47.57 21.85 118.43
1993 139.17 46.44 21.36 116.75
1994 137.28 51.01 21.77 119.98
1995 138.35 40.82 23.29 114.89
1996 140.73 43.49 26.49 115.64
1997 117.00
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Regional Statistics50
Table 5B: Tourism capacity and activity, 1981-97 (per 100 inh.)

























1981 1.48 110.84 58.33 4.06 128.15 249.41 6.46 97.42 1105.89 2.94 106.88 314.44
1982 1.53 108.54 55.54 4.17 146.85 275.15 9.33 103.11 1073.01 3.18 107.95 305.99
1983 1.78 99.25 60.41 4.31 141.27 238.88 7.81 103.84 1036.68 3.23 103.27 276.94
1984 1.89 106.18 69.75 4.36 150.36 293.34 8.75 114.30 1334.76 3.37 111.39 331.67
1985 1.97 114.78 72.80 4.47 164.28 282.41 9.41 119.65 1411.73 3.50 115.79 357.27
1986 2.09 109.39 67.59 4.62 141.78 266.60 10.14 106.94 1448.83 3.61 106.12 354.54
1987 1.99 109.71 81.17 4.76 137.68 302.36 10.96 105.67 1387.10 3.75 103.92 361.29
1988 2.19 113.33 65.73 4.82 154.21 268.60 12.08 123.00 1471.96 3.94 112.14 346.51
1989 2.38 123.37 63.74 4.87 171.05 241.58 13.53 124.82 1497.46 4.20 118.79 338.53
1990 2.44 120.39 74.08 4.72 161.91 235.48 14.51 113.42 1658.45 4.31 116.44 357.23
1991 2.53 118.10 58.28 4.73 157.94 152.35 15.39 128.58 1355.63 4.48 117.59 297.48
1992 2.64 129.30 74.81 4.62 160.19 184.05 15.93 119.75 1644.11 4.61 120.34 357.48
1993 2.74 123.17 71.51 4.62 159.61 172.39 16.82 120.86 1682.71 4.81 120.78 357.51
1994 2.77 137.48 90.57 4.53 174.86 184.17 16.98 107.33 1833.89 4.88 122.79 397.95
1995 2.91 141.68 79.40 4.78 163.02 173.62 19.78 134.60 1717.27 5.33 124.74 378.45
1996 2.94 143.72 75.26 4.77 162.89 179.37 20.07 148.72 1654.28 5.46 127.10 353.57
1997 2.96 147.20 83.66 4.87 165.06 166.08 20.05 157.50 1898.44 5.50 131.92 387.8151
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D 20-50% Mesinias (PE) 35% Mesinias (PE)
Part of Karditsa (TH)
Part of Arkadia (PE)
* Except for a small part going to zone C.
** Except for a small part going to zone D.
^ Partly characterised as industrially declining regions after 1996 receiving further support (zone D)
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Greece52
Table 7B. The allocation of ROPs in Crete, Peloponnese and Thessaly, 1994-99
Crete Peloponnese Thessaly
Share of national population 5.2 5.9 7.1
Share of regional CSF II funds 5.96 6.72 8.51
Total funds for the 1994-99 period 435.3 kecu 440.3 kecu 560.9 kecu
Funds per head 810 ecu 727 ecu 767 ecu
Allocation of funds:
Rural development 13.0 9.1 17.1
Infrastructure 23.2 11.9 16.6
Industry 4.9 0.6 3.6
Human resources 23.3 17.9 19.4
Urban development 0.4 2.0 1.4
Investment - 16.2 11.1
Support of SMEs 5.7 0.5 0.3
Environment 9.8 6.3 8.2
Local Development 6.6 13.8 15.7
Tourism 12.2 20.6 6.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Community Support Framework of Greece (1994-1999).
Table 8B: Regional distribution of the Program of Public Investment 1988-95 (mil.dr/1000inh.)
Thessaly Peloponnese Crete West Macedonia
1988 18.03 25.31 29.45 20.24
1989 21.82 27.69 33.83 27.96
1990 23.59 24.86 37.06 23.13
1991 31.48 28.09 43.20 39.16
1992 42.30 37.49 59.39 61.07
1993 36.73 38.68 64.08 65.50
1994 41.86 37.17 60.51 55.65
1995 55.91 41.18 79.49 80.66
Source: Lambrinidis et.al. (1998)TUFTS UNIVERSITY
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